documentation/decision_theory/newcomblike_problems_are_the_norm.myco

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[[Decision Theory/Newcomb's Paradox|Newcomb's Paradox]] is sometimes considered a contrived scenario designed to make CDT perform "badly", since most real-world interactions do not involve near-perfect predictors like [[Omega]]^^[citation needed]^^. However, the basic conclusions resulting from it it still hold even if Omega has a nontrivial advantage over random chance. This is realistic: when interacting with each other, [[humans]] frequently attempt to predict the actions of other agents and take different actions depending on those predictions. Humans use crude special-case approximations to the underlying [[accursed decision theories]], such as [[trust]], [[anger]], [[vengeance]] and [[honor]], but decision-theoretic frameworks allow for a useful conception and generalization cleaner than the notion of "useful irrationality".