43 lines
5.1 KiB
Plaintext
43 lines
5.1 KiB
Plaintext
Consciousness is a widely-misunderstood property of [[objects]]. Unlike [[descriptive properties]], which have empirically observable consequences and correlates, consciousness is a [[normative properties|normative property]] - an object is conscious if and inasmuch as it is [[bad]] to [[harm]], [[inconvenience]], [[kill]] or implode it. Arguments about whether things are or are not "conscious" are, as such, best interpreted as arguments about whether those things have [[moral worth]] rather than anything empirical. Frequent references to the importance of consciousness are signalling of virtue and conscientiousness wrt. detecting possible allies.
|
|
|
|
Twin studies in relativistic trolley collisions estimate that consciousness is responsible for about 30% of variance in moral worth.
|
|
|
|
== Incorrect, bad models
|
|
|
|
=== Computationalism
|
|
|
|
Consciousness is widely held to result from certain kinds of computation. For instance, [[https://scottaaronson.blog/?p=1799|integrated information theory]] holds that computations which "integrate information" are conscious. This neatly avoids various problems with other models. However, it has many flaws if considered in depth:
|
|
|
|
* "Computations" aren't exactly a low-level physical property of the universe: the same systems can be interpreted as "computing" many different things.
|
|
* {This leads to a number of [[confusing]] scenarios - for example, a [[homomorphically encrypted]] computation may or may not be conscious, but this cannot be tested externally, creating moral problems.
|
|
* You can check externally if you have a key. What happens if the key is deleted? What if it is not deleted, but is very difficult to obtain (timelock encryption)?}
|
|
* There is also the problem of measuring "how much" consciousness is happening: for example, what happens if I run a conscious mind on a pair of computers in lockstep, and then disable one half? What if instead of disabling one half, it is instead subjected to slightly different stimuli?
|
|
* "Incidental computations" by all kinds of systems should plausibly be creating consciousness in very strange scenarios. Why do we experience a rulebound, consistent, simple universe? See also [[Boltzmann brains]].
|
|
* What if I represent my computable, conscious function as a very big lookup table?
|
|
|
|
=== Dualism
|
|
|
|
No.
|
|
|
|
=== Physicalism
|
|
|
|
It is likely that physics, as implemented by the [[universe]], can be simulated to arbitrary precision on a [[computer]]. This includes the parts of physics which conscious beings use. If consciousness is determined by physical hardware, then that physics can thus be simulated on a computer and will behave identically (or at least up to [[thermal noise limits]], with enough simulation precision) to the physical version. Either this is not possible - physics is not computable - or consciousness is [[Newton's Flaming Laser Sword|epiphenomenal]], which is bad, or consciousness is generated by computation of some form.
|
|
|
|
=== Julian Jaynes
|
|
|
|
In [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Origin_of_Consciousness_in_the_Breakdown_of_the_Bicameral_Mind|The Origin Of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind]], Julian Jaynes draws from various historical sources, using more literal translations rather than standard reinterpretations, to argue that in the [[Late Bronze Age]], Europeans became conscious due to the failure of their hallucinatory [[god|gods]] at modelling the new and unpredictable scenarios they were in, and that this led to planning and coordination advantages. It [[https://slatestarcodex.com/2020/06/01/book-review-origin-of-consciousness-in-the-breakdown-of-the-bicameral-mind/|has been argued]] that the book is describing a change to theory of mind or functional organization rather than "consciousness".
|
|
|
|
The theory is compelling and surprisingly well-evidenced, excepting the minor detail that no such transition from "bicameralism" to "consciousness" is visible in any other society despite apparently having been a hugely memorable and destabilizing event for Europeans. The closest I'm aware of is [[https://www.ranprieur.com/readings/preconquest.html|Preconquest Consciousness]], but this isn't especially close (and is implausible for other reasons).
|
|
|
|
== Incorrect, funny models
|
|
|
|
* God endows sufficiently parameterized [[neural nets]] with a soul.
|
|
* Consciousness is a culturally transmitted phenomenon inherited from crows.
|
|
* Consciousness is the inelegant global [[mutex]] of the mind ([[distributed systems design]] is hard).
|
|
* Consciousness is proportional to baryon number.
|
|
* Due to compute limitations, consciousness was shut down in 1971.
|
|
* Consciousness is an ugly hack used by compute-limited agents which allows them to connect their world model to their own observations ("[[https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ethRJh2E7mSSjzCay/building-phenomenological-bridges|phenomenological bridge]]").
|
|
* Chinese-speaking computers cannot be conscious (Chinese Room argument).
|
|
* Consciousness scales with parameter count (but in a non-soul-related way).
|
|
* Consciousness is fully epiphenomenal - discussion of consciousness is illusory.
|
|
* Consciousness is a strange and unnecessary pituitary gland function. |