Edit ‘decision_theory/newcombs_paradox’
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@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ A CDT agent reasons that, regardless of what happened in the past, they will alw
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An EDT agent reasons that their behaviour now is evidence about what the (unobserved) opaque box's contents are - conditional on them taking box A and B, the B very probably contains nothing, and conditional on them taking B only, B very probably contains $10000000. As such, they take box B only and receive $1000000.
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The problem is sometimes criticized for artificially "rewarding irrationality" (EDT-like behaviour), but [[Decision Theory/Newcomblike Problems Are The Norm]].
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=== Generalizations
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The Transparent Newcomb's Paradox variant makes both boxes transparent.
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The Transparent Newcomb's Paradox variant makes both boxes transparent. This results in EDT no longer necessarily oneboxing (picking only B).
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